fix: audit S3 protocol — 15+ security & correctness fixes
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HIGH severity fixes:
- H1: Bot token leak via 302 redirect — always proxy S3 GETs
- H2: PUT TOCTOU race — add unique partial index (bucket_id, s3_key) WHERE NOT deleted
- H3: GET/HEAD ignore conditional headers (If-Match, If-None-Match, etc.)
- H4: Body payload hash not verified — add verifyBodyHash() post-stream check
- H5: Header-based auth has no expiry check — add 15-min clock skew window
- H7: Multipart abort does not delete parts — DELETE before UPDATE status
- H8: CompleteMultipartUpload skips part number & etag verification
- H9: XML regex fails on keys containing < — use non-greedy [\s\S]*?
- H10: Path-style vs virtual-hosted key decode mismatch

MEDIUM severity fixes:
- M1: Add Date header fallback for x-amz-date
- M2/M3: Validate service/termination in credential scope
- M4: Temp file leak when forwardToStorage throws in handleUploadPart
- M5: Multipart key consistency check (s3Key matches URL)
- M7: Use stored content-type from multipart initiate
- M9: Copy conditional headers skip when fileHash is null
- M11: Add 1000-key limit on DeleteObjects
- M13: Stricter bucket name validation (no .., no IP format)
- M14: NaN partNumber bypasses validation

LOW fixes:
- normalizeUri: dot-segment removal per RFC 3986
- localeCompare -> byte-order comparison in canonical query string
- Validate host in signed headers
- Server: AmazonS3 header on all responses
- x-amz-id-2 separate from x-amz-request-id
- IPv6 handling in stripPort
- Quiet element whitespace tolerance in XML parser
- content-type: application/xml on empty 2xx responses
- Duplicate interfaces/s3/ -> re-exports from utils/s3/

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-07-29 08:02:28 +07:00
parent f5d56f52d4
commit af160e0f33
9 changed files with 475 additions and 449 deletions
+149 -26
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ export interface VerifyPresignedUrlInput {
const SERVICE = 's3';
const TERMINATION = 'aws4_request';
/**
* Maximum acceptable clock skew between client and server for header-based
* SigV4 authentication. AWS allows 15 minutes.
*/
const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
const buf = (data: string | ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): Uint8Array => {
if (data instanceof Uint8Array) return data;
@@ -129,10 +135,40 @@ const buildCanonicalRequest = (
return `${method}\n${canonicalUri}\n${canonicalQueryString}\n${canonicalHeaders}\n${signedHeaders}\n${hashedPayload}`;
};
/**
* Normalizes a URI per AWS SigV4 requirements plus RFC 3986:
*
* 1. Decode percent-encoded characters
* 2. Remove dot-segments (`.` and `..`) per RFC 3986 section 5.2.4
*
* @param uri - The raw URI path to normalize.
* @returns The normalized URI path.
*/
const normalizeUri = (uri: string): string => {
if (!uri || uri === '') return '/';
// AWS SigV4 requires URI-decoded paths in the canonical request
return decodeURIComponent(uri);
// Step 1: Decode (SigV4 requirement)
const decoded = decodeURIComponent(uri);
// Step 2: Remove dot-segments per RFC 3986 section 5.2.4
const segments = decoded.split('/');
const result: string[] = [];
for (const segment of segments) {
if (segment === '.' || segment === '') {
// Skip `.` and empty segments (from double slashes)
continue;
}
if (segment === '..') {
result.pop(); // Go up one level
continue;
}
result.push(segment);
}
// Reconstruct path
const normalized = result.length > 0 ? `/${result.join('/')}` : '/';
return normalized;
};
const awsEncode = (value: string): string =>
@@ -149,23 +185,57 @@ export const buildCanonicalQueryString = (
for (const [key, value] of searchParams.entries()) {
if (!excludeKeys.has(key)) pairs.push([key, value]);
}
// AWS SigV4 requires UTF-8 byte-order (code point) comparison, NOT localeCompare
pairs.sort(([ak, av], [bk, bv]) => {
const a = `${awsEncode(ak)}=${awsEncode(av)}`;
const b = `${awsEncode(bk)}=${awsEncode(bv)}`;
return a.localeCompare(b);
if (a < b) return -1;
if (a > b) return 1;
return 0;
});
return pairs.map(([key, value]) => `${awsEncode(key)}=${awsEncode(value)}`).join('&');
};
const getHashedPayload = async (
body: string | null,
contentSha256: string | null,
): Promise<string> => {
if (contentSha256) return contentSha256;
const getHashedPayload = async (body: string | null): Promise<string> => {
if (!body || body.length === 0) return await sha256Hex('');
return await sha256Hex(body);
};
/**
* Parses an AWS SigV4 `x-amz-date` value (e.g. `20260707T120000Z`) into a Date.
*
* @param amzDate - The date string in `YYYYMMDDTHHmmssZ` format.
* @returns The parsed Date, or null if the format is invalid.
*/
const parseAmzDateUtc = (amzDate: string): Date | null => {
const match = amzDate.match(/^(\d{4})(\d{2})(\d{2})T(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})Z$/);
if (!match) return null;
const [, year, month, day, hour, minute, second] = match;
return new Date(
Date.UTC(
Number.parseInt(year, 10),
Number.parseInt(month, 10) - 1,
Number.parseInt(day, 10),
Number.parseInt(hour, 10),
Number.parseInt(minute, 10),
Number.parseInt(second, 10),
),
);
};
/**
* Validates that `host` is included in the signed headers list.
*
* AWS SigV4 mandates that `host` is always signed. Reject requests that
* omit it to prevent header injection / replay variants.
*
* @param signedHeaders - The semicolon-separated signed headers string.
* @returns True if `host` is present.
*/
const validateSignedHeaders = (signedHeaders: string): boolean => {
return signedHeaders.split(';').some((h) => h.toLowerCase() === 'host');
};
export const verifySignature = async (
method: string,
url: string,
@@ -193,6 +263,16 @@ export const verifySignature = async (
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'SignatureDoesNotMatch' };
}
// Validate service and termination in credential scope (M2)
if (parsed.service !== SERVICE || parsed.termination !== TERMINATION) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'SignatureDoesNotMatch' };
}
// Validate host is in signed headers (LOW/host)
if (!validateSignedHeaders(parsed.signedHeaders)) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'AccessDenied' };
}
const parsedUrl = new URL(url, 'http://localhost');
const canonicalUri = normalizeUri(parsedUrl.pathname);
const canonicalQueryString = buildCanonicalQueryString(parsedUrl.searchParams);
@@ -201,7 +281,11 @@ export const verifySignature = async (
if (contentSha256?.startsWith('STREAMING-')) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'NotImplemented' };
}
const hashedPayload = await getHashedPayload(body, contentSha256);
// H4: Compute hash from actual body instead of trusting header blindly.
// For streaming bodies (body === null), we cannot hash at this point —
// the caller (controller) must verify body hash after streaming.
const hashedPayload = await getHashedPayload(body);
const canonicalRequest = buildCanonicalRequest(
method,
@@ -214,8 +298,31 @@ export const verifySignature = async (
const hashedCanonicalRequest = await sha256Hex(canonicalRequest);
const amzDate = headers['x-amz-date'] || '';
// M1: Fall back to Date header if x-amz-date is missing
const amzDate = headers['x-amz-date'] || headers.date || '';
// H5: Validate request freshness (clock skew / replay protection)
if (amzDate) {
const requestDate = parseAmzDateUtc(amzDate);
if (requestDate) {
const now = Date.now();
const skew = Math.abs(now - requestDate.getTime());
if (skew > MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_MS) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'RequestExpired' };
}
}
}
const dateStamp = parsed.date;
// M3: Ensure date in credential scope matches x-amz-date
if (amzDate) {
const amzDateStamp = amzDate.slice(0, 8); // "YYYYMMDD"
if (amzDateStamp !== dateStamp) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'SignatureDoesNotMatch' };
}
}
const credentialScope = `${dateStamp}/${region}/${parsed.service}/${parsed.termination}`;
const stringToSign = `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n${amzDate}\n${credentialScope}\n${hashedCanonicalRequest}`;
@@ -238,22 +345,6 @@ export const verifySignature = async (
};
};
const parseAmzDateUtc = (amzDate: string): Date | null => {
const match = amzDate.match(/^(\d{4})(\d{2})(\d{2})T(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})Z$/);
if (!match) return null;
const [, year, month, day, hour, minute, second] = match;
return new Date(
Date.UTC(
Number.parseInt(year, 10),
Number.parseInt(month, 10) - 1,
Number.parseInt(day, 10),
Number.parseInt(hour, 10),
Number.parseInt(minute, 10),
Number.parseInt(second, 10),
),
);
};
export const verifyPresignedUrl = async ({
url,
method,
@@ -312,6 +403,11 @@ export const verifyPresignedUrl = async ({
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'SignatureDoesNotMatch' };
}
// Validate host is in signed headers for presigned URLs too
if (!validateSignedHeaders(signedHeaders)) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'AccessDenied' };
}
const signedHeaderList = signedHeaders.split(';').filter(Boolean);
const canonicalHeaders = signedHeaderList
.map((headerName) => {
@@ -340,3 +436,30 @@ export const isS3Request = (headers: Record<string, string>): boolean => {
const auth = headers.authorization || '';
return auth.startsWith('AWS4-HMAC-SHA256');
};
/**
* Verifies that the actual body SHA-256 matches the `x-amz-content-sha256`
* header from the original request.
*
* This MUST be called AFTER the body has been fully streamed and hashed,
* as a second pass after `verifySignature` (which cannot hash a streaming
* body without consuming it).
*
* @param bodySha256 - The SHA-256 hex digest of the actual body content.
* @param headers - The original request headers.
* @returns An error result on mismatch, or null if the check passes.
*/
export const verifyBodyHash = (
bodySha256: string,
headers: Record<string, string>,
): SigV4Result | null => {
const claimedHash = headers['x-amz-content-sha256'];
// If the client sent UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD, skip verification
if (!claimedHash || claimedHash === 'UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD' || claimedHash.startsWith('STREAMING-')) {
return null;
}
if (claimedHash !== bodySha256) {
return { isValid: false, credential: null, errorCode: 'BadDigest' };
}
return null;
};
+9 -1
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@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
import { nanoid } from 'nanoid';
export const S3_CORS_HEADERS: Record<string, string> = {
'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
'access-control-allow-methods': 'GET, PUT, HEAD, DELETE, POST, OPTIONS',
@@ -31,7 +33,13 @@ export const s3Headers = (
extraHeaders: Record<string, string> = {},
): Record<string, string> => ({
...S3_CORS_HEADERS,
...(requestId ? { 'x-amz-request-id': requestId, 'x-amz-id-2': requestId } : {}),
server: 'AmazonS3',
...(requestId
? {
'x-amz-request-id': requestId,
'x-amz-id-2': `${requestId}+${nanoid(16)}`,
}
: {}),
...extraHeaders,
});
+5 -1
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@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
const stripPort = (host: string): string => {
if (host.startsWith('[')) return host;
// Handle IPv6: [::1]:8080 -> [::1]
if (host.startsWith('[')) {
const closeBracket = host.indexOf(']');
return host.slice(0, closeBracket + 1).toLowerCase();
}
return host.split(':')[0].toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, '');
};
+5 -3
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@@ -277,8 +277,10 @@ export const s3ErrorResponse = (
// ─────── DeleteObjects XML parser ───────
export const parseDeleteObjectsBody = (body: string): { keys: string[]; quiet: boolean } => {
const keys = Array.from(body.matchAll(/<Key>([^<]+)<\/Key>/g), (match) => match[1]);
const quiet = body.includes('<Quiet>true</Quiet>') || body.includes('<Quiet>true ');
// H9: Use non-greedy match to handle keys containing < character
const keys = Array.from(body.matchAll(/<Key>([\s\S]*?)<\/Key>/g), (match) => match[1]);
// Handle whitespace inside <Quiet> element + namespace prefix support
const quiet = /<\w*:?Quiet\w*>\s*true\s*<\/\w*:?Quiet\w*>/i.test(body);
return { keys, quiet };
};
@@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ export const parseCompleteMultipartBody = (body: string): CompletePart[] => {
const etagMatch = partXml.match(/<ETag>"?([^"<\s]+)"?<\/ETag>/);
if (numMatch && etagMatch) {
parts.push({
partNumber: parseInt(numMatch[1], 10),
partNumber: Number.parseInt(numMatch[1], 10),
etag: etagMatch[1].replace(/^"/, '').replace(/"$/, ''),
});
}