feat: update README and documentation for new tools and features

- Updated README.md to reflect the addition of 3 new built-in tools, bringing the total to 37.
- Revised architecture documentation to indicate the increase in tool count.
- Enhanced backend documentation with updated line counts for various modules.
- Modified data documentation to change edit log format from JSON to JSONL.
- Updated dependencies documentation to reflect version upgrades for several crates.
- Improved prompts for auto-reviewer, division implementer, planner, tester, and quality reviewer to enforce stricter coding standards regarding linter bypasses.
- Refactored code in various modules to improve clarity and performance, including updates to error handling and tool execution logic.
- Added comprehensive tests for IPC frame serialization and deserialization.
This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
2026-07-13 14:39:39 +07:00
parent 00e29139c5
commit 1d50b94eec
23 changed files with 327 additions and 176 deletions
+55 -52
View File
@@ -391,67 +391,62 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: &SubagentContext, tx: &mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) ->
// Push the assistant message with tool_calls into the conversation
messages.push(response);
for tool_call in &tool_calls {
// Check abort flag before each tool execution
if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
step,
error: "subagent aborted by parent during tool execution".to_string(),
});
anyhow::bail!("subagent aborted by parent during tool call at step {step}");
}
let mut results_vec = Vec::new();
std::thread::scope(|s| {
let mut handles = Vec::new();
let tools_ref = &tools;
let tool_ctx_ref = &tool_ctx;
for tool_call in &tool_calls {
let handle = s.spawn(move || {
// Check abort flag before each tool execution
if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
return (tool_call, Err(anyhow::anyhow!("subagent aborted by parent during tool execution")));
}
let tool_name = &tool_call.function.name;
let args = crate::dto::chat::tool::sanitize_tool_arguments(&tool_call.function.arguments);
let explicitly_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.contains(tool_name);
let generally_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.is_empty() || explicitly_allowed;
// Level 1: allowlist check — is this tool even permitted?
if !generally_allowed {
return (tool_call, Ok(format!("tool '{tool_name}' not allowed for this subagent")));
}
// Level 2: risky tool check — risky tools require explicit permission
if tool_is_risky(tool_name) && !explicitly_allowed {
return (tool_call, Ok(format!("risky tool '{tool_name}' requires explicit permission; not allowed for this subagent")));
}
// Level 3: Harness-style content safety gating
if let Some(block_reason) = gate_subagent_tool_call(tool_name, &args) {
return (tool_call, Ok(format!("Blocked by subagent gate: {block_reason}")));
}
let result = match tools_ref.iter().find(|t| t.name() == tool_name.as_str()) {
Some(tool) => tool.run(tool_ctx_ref, &args),
None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tool '{tool_name}' not found")),
};
(tool_call, result)
});
handles.push(handle);
}
for h in handles {
if let Ok(res) = h.join() {
results_vec.push(res);
}
}
});
for (tool_call, result) in results_vec {
let tool_name = &tool_call.function.name;
let args = crate::dto::chat::tool::sanitize_tool_arguments(&tool_call.function.arguments);
let explicitly_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.contains(tool_name);
let generally_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.is_empty() || explicitly_allowed;
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolCall {
tool: tool_name.clone(),
args: args.clone(),
});
// Level 1: allowlist check — is this tool even permitted?
if !generally_allowed {
let msg = format!("tool '{tool_name}' not allowed for this subagent");
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
tool: tool_name.clone(),
output: msg,
});
continue;
}
// Level 2: risky tool check — risky tools require explicit permission
if tool_is_risky(tool_name) && !explicitly_allowed {
let msg = format!("risky tool '{tool_name}' requires explicit permission; not allowed for this subagent");
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
tool: tool_name.clone(),
output: msg,
});
continue;
}
// Level 3: Harness-style content safety gating — mirrors the main
// agent's gate_tool_call checks (path traversal, reason validation,
// stub/denial/assumption scanning, bash exfiltration, destructive
// commands, sensitive path reads).
if let Some(block_reason) = gate_subagent_tool_call(tool_name, &args) {
let msg = format!("Blocked by subagent gate: {block_reason}");
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
tool: tool_name.clone(),
output: msg,
});
continue;
}
let result = match tools.iter().find(|t| t.name() == tool_name.as_str()) {
Some(tool) => tool.run(&tool_ctx, &args),
None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tool '{tool_name}' not found")),
};
match result {
Ok(output_text) => {
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), output_text.clone()));
@@ -461,6 +456,14 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: &SubagentContext, tx: &mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) ->
});
}
Err(e) => {
let err_str = e.to_string();
if err_str.contains("subagent aborted by parent") {
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
step,
error: err_str.clone(),
});
anyhow::bail!("{err_str}");
}
let msg = format!("tool '{tool_name}' failed: {e}");
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {