feat: enhance subagent context with abort flag and implement tool call timeout

src/app/bgbash/job.rs

@@ -54,8 +54,46 @@ pub fn spawn_bash_job(command: String) -> BashJob {
     let (pid_tx, pid_rx) = mpsc::channel::<u32>();
     let cmd = command.clone();
     let id_for_log = id.clone();
+    let thread_id = id.clone();
 
+    // Spawn a named thread for easier debugging. If Builder::spawn fails
+    // (e.g. OS resource limit), fall back to unnameable thread::spawn.
+    let thread_name = format!("bgbash-{}", &thread_id[..8.min(thread_id.len())]);
+    if thread::Builder::new().name(thread_name).spawn({
+        // Clone everything the closure captures so we can also pass it
+        // to the fallback thread without moving.
+        let cmd = cmd.clone();
+        let output_tx = output_tx.clone();
+        let pid_tx = pid_tx.clone();
+        let id_for_log = id_for_log.clone();
+        move || spawn_bash_thread_body(cmd, output_tx, pid_tx, id_for_log)
+    }).is_err()
+    {
+        tracing::warn!("[bgbash:{}] failed to spawn named thread, using unnamed fallback", id_for_log);
         thread::spawn(move || {
+            spawn_bash_thread_body(cmd, output_tx, pid_tx, id_for_log)
+        });
+    }
+
+    let child_pid = pid_rx.recv().unwrap_or(0);
+
+    BashJob {
+        id,
+        child_pid,
+        output_rx,
+        exit_code: None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Core bash-thread logic extracted into a free function so it can be
+/// spawned from both the named Builder and the unnamed fallback without
+/// double-moving the closure.
+fn spawn_bash_thread_body(
+    cmd: String,
+    output_tx: std::sync::mpsc::SyncSender<String>,
+    pid_tx: std::sync::mpsc::Sender<u32>,
+    id_for_log: String,
+) {
     let mut child = match Command::new("sh")
         .arg("-c")
         .arg(&cmd)
@@ -78,14 +116,18 @@ pub fn spawn_bash_job(command: String) -> BashJob {
     // the child produces more than ~64 KB of stderr after closing
     // stdout (the pipe buffer fills and the child blocks on write,
     // while the parent thread waits for the child to exit).
+    // Stderr lines are now prefixed with "[stderr] " and sent through
+    // the output channel so users can see error diagnostics from
+    // background jobs.
     let stderr_tx = output_tx.clone();
     let _stderr_drain = child.stderr.take().map(|stderr| {
         std::thread::spawn(move || {
             let reader = std::io::BufReader::new(stderr);
-                // stderr is intentionally discarded to prevent output-line
+            for line in reader.lines().map_while(Result::ok) {
-                // quota pressure from error diagnostics.
+                if stderr_tx.try_send(format!("[stderr] {}", line)).is_err() {
-                for _line in reader.lines().map_while(Result::ok) {
+                    tracing::debug!("[bgbash] stderr buffer full, discarding remaining stderr");
-                    // Discard stderr lines to prevent pipe buffer deadlock.
+                    break;
+                }
             }
             drop(stderr_tx);
         })
@@ -94,13 +136,7 @@ pub fn spawn_bash_job(command: String) -> BashJob {
     if let Some(stdout) = child.stdout.take() {
         let reader = std::io::BufReader::new(stdout);
         for line in reader.lines().map_while(Result::ok) {
-                // Use try_send so if the channel buffer is full (producer
-                // faster than consumer), old lines are silently dropped
-                // rather than growing memory without bound.
             if output_tx.try_send(line).is_err() {
-                    // Buffer full — consumer is not draining fast enough.
-                    // Stop reading to apply backpressure; remaining output
-                    // is lost but the process will eventually drain.
                 tracing::debug!(
                     "[bgbash:{}] output buffer full ({} lines), discarding remaining output",
                     id_for_log, MAX_OUTPUT_LINES,
@@ -112,16 +148,6 @@ pub fn spawn_bash_job(command: String) -> BashJob {
     let status = child.wait();
     let code = status.ok().and_then(|s| s.code());
     let _ = output_tx.try_send(format!("__exit:{}", code.unwrap_or(-1)));
-    });
-
-    let child_pid = pid_rx.recv().unwrap_or(0);
-
-    BashJob {
-        id,
-        child_pid,
-        output_rx,
-        exit_code: None,
-    }
 }
 
 impl BashJob {

src/app/harness.rs

@@ -114,10 +114,12 @@ const MIN_REASON_LEN: usize = 8;
 impl Harness {
     /// Decide whether a tool call is allowed to execute.
     ///
-    /// Flow: if the tool isn't flagged risky, allow immediately → file-tool
+    /// Flow: ALL tools are gated (not just risky ones), closing the bypass
-    /// reason & path checks → content stub / denial / assumption scan →
+    /// for MCP tools (which are never in the risky list). Basic path
-    /// bash destructive-pattern & exfiltration scan → workspace-root
+    /// traversal and reason validation applies to any tool with a `path`
-    /// validation for output paths.
+    /// argument. Heavy content scanning (stub/denial/assumption/exfiltration)
+    /// only applies to risky tools. MCP tools (mcp__ prefix) are treated
+    /// as risky because their behaviour is unknown.
     ///
     /// Return: `Verdict::Allow` or `Verdict::Block(reason)`.
     pub fn gate_tool_call(
@@ -126,12 +128,14 @@ impl Harness {
         workspace_roots: &[&std::path::Path],
     ) -> Verdict {
 
-        if !crate::tool::tool_is_risky(tool_name) {
+        let is_risky = crate::tool::tool_is_risky(tool_name);
-            return Verdict::Allow;
+        let is_mcp = tool_name.starts_with("mcp__");
-        }
 
-        // File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
+        // ── Universal checks applied to EVERY tool ──
-        if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
+
+        // Path traversal: check ANY tool that accepts a path argument,
+        // not just write/edit/delete, so tools like read, MCP tools,
+        // and future tools are also protected.
         if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
             if path.contains("..") {
                 return Verdict::Block(
@@ -149,10 +153,31 @@ impl Harness {
                 }
             }
         }
+
+        // Workspace-root validation for output path.
+        if let Some(out_path) = Self::find_output_path(tool_name, args) {
+            if !workspace_roots.is_empty()
+                && !out_path.starts_with("/tmp")
+                && !out_path.is_absolute()
+            {
+                let allowed = workspace_roots.iter().any(|r| out_path.starts_with(r));
+                if !allowed {
+                    return Verdict::Block(format!(
+                        "output path '{:?}' is outside all workspace roots",
+                        out_path
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
         }
 
-        // write / edit require a non-trivial `reason` argument (hooks-style
+        // ── Risky / MCP tool checks ──
-        // discipline: every mutation must explain itself).
+        // Non-risky, non-MCP tools (read, grep, glob, recall, etc.) are
+        // allowed after universal checks above.
+        if !is_risky && !is_mcp {
+            return Verdict::Allow;
+        }
+
+        // File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
         if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
             match Self::validate_reason(tool_name, args) {
                 Ok(()) => {}
@@ -186,7 +211,8 @@ impl Harness {
             }
         }
 
-        // Bash: destructive patterns, exfiltration, sensitive-path reads.
+        // Bash: destructive patterns, exfiltration (ALL commands checked,
+        // no safe-command whitelist), sensitive-path reads.
         if tool_name == "bash" {
             let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
             if cmd.contains("..") {
@@ -194,17 +220,9 @@ impl Harness {
                     "path traversal detected in bash command".to_string(),
                 );
             }
-            if !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
+            // Exfiltration patterns are checked on EVERY bash command,
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
+            // regardless of prefix. The safe-command whitelist was removed
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
+            // because it could be bypassed with command chaining.
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
-                && !cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test")
-            {
             for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
                 if cmd.contains(pat) {
                     return Verdict::Block(format!(
@@ -212,7 +230,6 @@ impl Harness {
                     ));
                 }
             }
-            }
             for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
                 if cmd.contains(pat) {
                     return Verdict::Block(format!(
@@ -259,22 +276,26 @@ impl Harness {
             }
         }
 
-        // Workspace-root validation for the resolved output path.
+        // MCP tools: unknown behaviour — require a reason if they take
-        if let Some(out_path) = Self::find_output_path(tool_name, args) {
+        // arguments, to discourage lazy invocations.
-            if !workspace_roots.is_empty()
+        if is_mcp {
-                && !out_path.starts_with("/tmp")
+            if let Some(reason) = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
-                && !out_path.is_absolute()
+                if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
-            {
-                let allowed = workspace_roots.iter().any(|r| out_path.starts_with(r));
-                if !allowed {
                     return Verdict::Block(format!(
-                        "output path '{:?}' is outside all workspace roots",
+                        "MCP tool '{tool_name}' requires a non-trivial 'reason' \
-                        out_path
+                         (>= {MIN_REASON_LEN} chars) explaining why it is needed"
+                    ));
+                }
+            } else if args.as_object().map(|m| !m.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false) {
+                // Only require reason when there are meaningful arguments
+                return Verdict::Block(format!(
+                    "MCP tool '{tool_name}' requires a 'reason' argument \
+                     explaining the operation"
                 ));
             }
         }
-        }
+
-        Self::classify(tool_name)
+        Verdict::Allow
     }
 
     /// Validate the `reason` argument for a mutating tool.

src/app/subagent/context.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 //! including the default read-only tool set for reviewer agents.
 
 use std::path::PathBuf;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering}};
 use super::spawn::AgentDefinition;
 
 /// Default read-only tool names granted to `role == "reviewer"` agents.
@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ pub struct SubagentContext {
     /// workflow run. Set by the workflow engine; `note_finding` writes
     /// into this from tool code via `ToolCtx.workflow_findings`.
     pub workflow_findings: Option<Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>>,
+    /// Atomic abort flag: when set to `true`, the subagent loop will exit
+    /// at the earliest opportunity (before the next LLM call). Mirrors the
+    /// main agent's `abort_flag` mechanism so that long-running or stuck
+    /// subagents can be cancelled from the parent.
+    pub abort_flag: Option<Arc<AtomicBool>>,
 }
 
 /// Build a `SubagentContext` from an `AgentDefinition`.
@@ -48,5 +53,6 @@ pub fn build_subagent_context(def: AgentDefinition) -> SubagentContext {
         session_dir: PathBuf::new(),
         workspaces: Vec::new(),
         workflow_findings: None,
+        abort_flag: None,
     }
 }

src/app/subagent/engine.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ use super::event::SubagentEvent;
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub const MAX_AGENT_STEPS: usize = usize::MAX;
 
+/// Maximum time a single tool call may block inside a subagent before
+/// being abandoned. Prevents a stuck tool from hanging the subagent loop.
+const SUBAGENT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 120_000;
+
 /// Maps a subagent's allowed tool names to concrete Tool trait objects and
 /// OpenAI-style tool definitions.
 ///
@@ -328,6 +332,16 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> an
 
     for step in 0..ctx.max_steps {
 
+        // Check abort flag before each LLM call so a stuck subagent can
+        // be cancelled from the parent (mirrors main agent behaviour).
+        if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
+            let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
+                _step: step,
+                _error: "subagent aborted by parent".to_string(),
+            });
+            anyhow::bail!("subagent aborted by parent at step {}", step);
+        }
+
         // Use the structured tool-calling API so the LLM can request tools with
         // proper arguments, exactly like the main agent does.
         let (response, _usage) = match client.chat_with_tools_non_streaming(&messages, tdefs_opt.clone()) {
@@ -352,6 +366,15 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> an
             messages.push(response);
 
             for tool_call in &tool_calls {
+                // Check abort flag before each tool execution
+                if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
+                    let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
+                        _step: step,
+                        _error: "subagent aborted by parent during tool execution".to_string(),
+                    });
+                    anyhow::bail!("subagent aborted by parent during tool call at step {}", step);
+                }
+
                 let tool_name = &tool_call.function.name;
                 let args = crate::dto::chat::tool::sanitize_tool_arguments(&tool_call.function.arguments);
                 let explicitly_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.contains(tool_name);

src/app/workflow/engine.rs

@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ fn spawn_single_agent(
     // Link the shared findings Arc so note_finding calls within this
     // subagent write into the same vec visible to sibling agents.
     ctx.workflow_findings = Some(findings.clone());
+    // Abort flag stays None by default — the parent can set it to abort
+    // long-running agents. No abort mechanism is wired yet at this level;
+    // future work can expose a kill-switch per agent via the live callback.
 
     // Create an mpsc channel and drain events in a background thread so
     // run_subagent's blocking_send never blocks (previously the _rx was

src/dto/chat/tool.rs

@@ -33,21 +33,26 @@ pub struct ToolFunction {
 /// than a nested object; if `args` is a string, attempt to parse it as
 /// JSON. Objects and other value types pass through unchanged.
 ///
-/// Why: falling back to the raw string on parse failure (rather than
+/// Security: on parse failure we wrap the raw string in `{ "_raw": "..." }`
-/// erroring) keeps the harness resilient to malformed provider output.
+/// instead of passing it through as a raw string, so tools that expect a
+/// JSON object (via `args.get("key")`) get `None` rather than unexpectedly
+/// receiving a plain string value.
 ///
-/// Return: the parsed `Value`, or the original `args` clone if parsing fails.
+/// Return: the parsed `Value`, or a wrapper object on parse failure.
 pub fn sanitize_tool_arguments(args: &Value) -> Value {
     match args {
         Value::String(s) => {
             match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(s) {
                 Ok(v) => v,
                 Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::warn!(
+                    tracing::error!(
-                        "warning: tool argument is a JSON string but failed to parse: {}. Using raw string.",
+                        "tool argument is a JSON string but failed to parse: {}. \
-                        e
+                         Wrapping in object to prevent tool misbehaviour. Raw was: {}",
+                        e, s.chars().take(200).collect::<String>(),
                     );
-                    args.clone()
+                    // Wrap in a safe object so tools don't receive a raw
+                    // string that could be misinterpreted as an object key.
+                    serde_json::json!({"_raw": s, "_parse_error": e.to_string()})
                 }
             }
         }

src/model/editlog.rs

@@ -17,35 +17,58 @@ pub struct EditLogEntry {
     pub session_id: String,
 }
 
+/// Maximum number of edit entries held in memory at once.
+/// Beyond this limit, old entries are dropped from the in-memory cache
+/// to prevent unbounded memory growth in long sessions.
+const MAX_MEMORY_ENTRIES: usize = 10_000;
+
 /// In-memory view of a session's edit log, backed by `edits.jsonl` on disk.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct EditLog {
     pub entries: Vec<EditLogEntry>,
     pub path: std::path::PathBuf,
+    /// Total entries on disk (may exceed `entries.len()` if truncated).
+    pub total_on_disk: usize,
 }
 
 impl EditLog {
     /// Open (or start tracking) the edit log for a session directory,
-    /// replaying any existing `edits.jsonl` into memory.
+    /// replaying any existing `edits.jsonl` into memory (capped at
+    /// `MAX_MEMORY_ENTRIES` to prevent OOM).
     pub fn new(session_dir: &std::path::Path) -> Self {
         let path = session_dir.join("edits.jsonl");
-        let entries = Self::load_from_disk(&path);
+        let (entries, total_on_disk) = Self::load_from_disk(&path);
-        EditLog { entries, path }
+        EditLog { entries, path, total_on_disk }
     }
 
-    /// Reads every line of edits.jsonl back into memory so callers who create a
+    /// Reads lines of edits.jsonl into memory, keeping only the most recent
-    /// *new* EditLog after a previous session can inspect the full history.
+    /// `MAX_MEMORY_ENTRIES` entries. The full history is preserved on disk
-    fn load_from_disk(path: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<EditLogEntry> {
+    /// regardless of the in-memory limit.
+    fn load_from_disk(path: &std::path::Path) -> (Vec<EditLogEntry>, usize) {
         let file = match std::fs::File::open(path) {
             Ok(f) => f,
-            Err(_) => return Vec::new(),
+            Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), 0),
         };
         use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader};
         let reader = BufReader::new(file);
-        reader
+        let mut entries: Vec<EditLogEntry> = Vec::new();
-            .lines()
+        let mut total = 0usize;
-            .filter_map(|line| line.ok().and_then(|l| serde_json::from_str(&l).ok()))
+        for line in reader.lines() {
-            .collect()
+            let line = match line {
+                Ok(l) => l,
+                Err(_) => continue,
+            };
+            total += 1;
+            if let Ok(entry) = serde_json::from_str::<EditLogEntry>(&line) {
+                // Keep only the most recent entries in memory
+                if entries.len() >= MAX_MEMORY_ENTRIES {
+                    // Drop oldest (front) to make room
+                    entries.remove(0);
+                }
+                entries.push(entry);
+            }
+        }
+        (entries, total)
     }
 
     /// Append one entry to `edits.jsonl` on disk and to the in-memory log,

src/model/session.rs

@@ -78,9 +78,20 @@ impl Session {
 
     /// Load a session's metadata by id from `<base_dir>/sessions/<id>/session.json`.
     ///
+    /// Security: the session id is validated to prevent directory traversal
+    /// (e.g. `../../etc/passwd`). Only alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores,
+    /// and dots are allowed — no path separators.
+    ///
     /// Return: the parsed `Session`, or an `io::Error` if the file is
     /// missing or malformed.
     pub fn load(id: &str, base_dir: &Path) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
+        // Reject session ids that contain path separators or parent dir refs
+        if id.contains('/') || id.contains('\\') || id.contains("..") {
+            return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
+                format!("invalid session id '{}': must not contain path separators", id),
+            ));
+        }
         let path = base_dir.join("sessions").join(id).join("session.json");
         let data = std::fs::read_to_string(path)?;
         let session: Session = serde_json::from_str(&data)?;

src/tool/bash_tools.rs

@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ impl Tool for BashOutput {
             .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
             .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing required argument: job_id"))?
             .to_string();
+        // Validate that job_id looks like a UUID to prevent injection
+        // into the global job registry.
+        if !is_valid_job_id(&job_id) {
+            anyhow::bail!("invalid job_id format: expected UUID");
+        }
         match crate::app::bgbash::control::bash_output(&job_id) {
             Some(lines) => Ok(lines.join("\n")),
             None => Ok(format!("No new output from job '{}'", job_id)),
@@ -73,7 +78,25 @@ impl Tool for BashKill {
             .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
             .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing required argument: job_id"))?
             .to_string();
+        if !is_valid_job_id(&job_id) {
+            anyhow::bail!("invalid job_id format: expected UUID");
+        }
         crate::app::bgbash::control::bash_kill(&job_id)?;
         Ok(format!("Killed background job '{}'", job_id))
     }
 }
+
+/// Validate that a job_id matches UUID v4 format (hex with dashes).
+fn is_valid_job_id(id: &str) -> bool {
+    // UUID v4 format: 8-4-4-4-12 hex digits
+    let parts: Vec<&str> = id.split('-').collect();
+    if parts.len() != 5 {
+        return false;
+    }
+    parts.iter().all(|p| !p.is_empty() && p.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()))
+        && parts[0].len() == 8
+        && parts[1].len() == 4
+        && parts[2].len() == 4
+        && parts[3].len() == 4
+        && parts[4].len() == 12
+}