feat: implement subagent tool gating and timeout mechanisms for enhanced security and performance

This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
2026-07-13 04:41:26 +07:00
parent d09e440e7e
commit 3b711bbf3b
7 changed files with 379 additions and 19 deletions
+27 -1
View File
@@ -350,7 +350,33 @@ pub fn trigger_review(state: &mut AppStateRest) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
probe_note,
);
let (tx, _rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
// Use a drain thread for subagent events (so blocking_send never
// fails on a closed channel) and log events at debug level for
// observability during review runs.
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
let _drain_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || {
use crate::app::subagent::event::SubagentEvent;
let mut rx = rx;
while let Some(event) = rx.blocking_recv() {
match &event {
SubagentEvent::ToolCall { _tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[review] tool call: {}", _tool);
}
SubagentEvent::ToolResult { _tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[review] tool result: {}", _tool);
}
SubagentEvent::StepCompleted { _step, .. } => {
tracing::trace!("[review] step {} completed", _step);
}
SubagentEvent::StepFailed { _step, _error } => {
tracing::warn!("[review] step {} failed: {}", _step, _error);
}
SubagentEvent::Completed { .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[review] completed");
}
}
}
});
let turn_events = state.turn_events.clone();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
+40 -3
View File
@@ -894,6 +894,11 @@ fn archive_message(db: &Option<std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<rusqlite::Connect
/// the agent gets stuck in a loop (e.g. an unachievable todo item).
const MAX_TURN_STEPS: usize = 10000;
/// Hard wall-clock timeout per agent turn (5 minutes). Prevents a single
/// user turn from running indefinitely even if the step budget isn't
/// exhausted (e.g. slow LLM responses, stuck tool calls).
const MAX_TURN_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 300_000;
/// Execute one full agent turn: stream the conversation to the LLM,
/// handle tool calls, and loop until the LLM produces a non-tool response
/// or runs out of unfinished todo items.
@@ -924,7 +929,11 @@ fn run_agent_turn(
let mut msgs = messages.to_vec();
let mut edits_this_turn = 0u32;
let mut prev_shaped = false;
let turn_start_ms = std::time::Instant::now();
// Build system prompt components once and cache them for the entire turn
// instead of regenerating on every loop iteration (which walks the full
// workspace tree and reads all memory files each time).
let tree_info = generate_workspace_tree(&tc.workspace_roots);
let memory_section = build_memory_section(&tc.ctx.memory_dir);
let system_text = format!(
@@ -941,6 +950,8 @@ fn run_agent_turn(
}
let mut turn_step = 0usize;
let mut todo_retry_count = 0usize;
const MAX_TODO_RETRIES: usize = 5;
loop {
turn_step += 1;
@@ -951,6 +962,13 @@ fn run_agent_turn(
MAX_TURN_STEPS,
);
}
if turn_start_ms.elapsed().as_millis() as u64 > MAX_TURN_TIMEOUT_MS {
anyhow::bail!(
"turn exceeded maximum duration ({}s) — aborting. \
Use /compact or shorter prompts if the model needs more time.",
MAX_TURN_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000,
);
}
let total_chars: usize = msgs.iter()
.filter_map(|m| m.content.as_deref())
.map(|c| c.len())
@@ -1049,10 +1067,18 @@ fn run_agent_turn(
}
}
if has_unfinished {
todo_retry_count += 1;
if todo_retry_count > MAX_TODO_RETRIES {
anyhow::bail!(
"exhausted {} todo-retries — giving up on unfinished tasks. \
Edit todo.md manually or ask me to focus on specific items.",
MAX_TODO_RETRIES,
);
}
if let Ok(mut q) = events_q.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "task_retry".to_string(),
message: format!("Network/API error: {}. Auto-retrying to finish tasks...", api_err),
message: format!("Network/API error: {}. Auto-retrying to finish tasks... (retry {}/{})", api_err, todo_retry_count, MAX_TODO_RETRIES),
});
}
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5));
@@ -1160,14 +1186,25 @@ fn run_agent_turn(
}
if has_unfinished {
let sys_text = "You stopped, but you still have unfinished tasks in todo.md (marked with '- [ ]'). You MUST continue working and use tools to finish them, or edit todo.md to mark them as done if they are finished.";
todo_retry_count += 1;
if todo_retry_count > MAX_TODO_RETRIES {
if let Ok(mut q) = events_q.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "task_retry".to_string(),
message: format!("Giving up after {} retries — some todo items remain unfinished. Edit todo.md manually or ask again.", MAX_TODO_RETRIES),
});
}
break;
}
let sys_text = format!("You stopped, but you still have unfinished tasks in todo.md (marked with '- [ ]'). You MUST continue working and use tools to finish them, or edit todo.md to mark them as done if they are finished. (Retry {}/{})", todo_retry_count, MAX_TODO_RETRIES);
let sys_text_clone = sys_text.clone();
let msg = ChatMessage::system(sys_text);
archive_message(&tc.db, &tc.session_id, &msg);
msgs.push(msg);
if let Ok(mut q) = events_q.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "task_retry".to_string(),
message: sys_text.to_string(),
message: sys_text_clone,
});
}
continue;
+240 -7
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
//! Subagent execution loop: drive an LLM conversation, gate tool calls
//! against the context's allowlist, run tools, and stream progress events
//! to the parent via an mpsc channel.
//!
//! Security: subagent tool gating mirrors the main agent's `Harness` checks
//! (path traversal, reason validation, stub/denial/assumption scanning,
//! bash exfiltration and destructive-pattern detection) so that subagents
//! are not a weaker link than the main agent.
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::dto::chat::message::ChatMessage;
@@ -73,24 +78,236 @@ fn resolve_provider_config() -> (String, String, Option<String>) {
(api_key, model, base_url)
}
// ─── Subagent-level tool gating (mirrors Harness checks) ───
const STUB_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"todo!()", "todo!(",
"unimplemented!()", "unimplemented!(",
"FIXME", "fixme:", "XXX:", "PLACEHOLDER",
"REPLACE_ME", "stub_value", "stub_function",
"fake_response", "fake_data",
"not implemented", "not yet implemented",
"to be implemented", "to be done",
];
const DENIAL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"// skip", "// skipping", "// skipping for now",
"// for now just", "// punt", "// hack:",
"// workaround:", "// cba", "// later",
"// do later", "// ignore for now", "// disable",
"// bypass", "// quick fix", "// temp fix",
"// temporary fix", "// temp:", "// temporary:",
"// noop",
];
const ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"// assume", "// probably", "// guess",
"// should work", "// hopefully", "// i think",
"// should be fine", "// likely",
];
const EXFIL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"curl ", "wget ", "nc -e ", "ncat ", "/dev/tcp/",
"base64 -d |", "base64 --decode |",
"openssl s_client", "ssh -R ",
"scp /", "rsync /",
];
const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
".ssh/id_rsa", ".ssh/id_ed25519",
".aws/credentials", ".aws/config",
".kube/config", ".docker/config.json",
"/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "/proc/self/environ",
];
const MIN_REASON_LEN: usize = 8;
/// Gate a tool call in the subagent context. Returns `Some(block_reason)` if
/// the call should be blocked, `None` to allow.
///
/// Flow: always blocks dangerous patterns — path traversal, stub/denial/
/// assumption language, bash exfiltration, destructive commands, sensitive
/// path reads — regardless of the allowed-tools list. Tools that are not
/// risky only get the basic allowlist check.
fn gate_subagent_tool_call(
tool_name: &str,
args: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Option<String> {
// File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
if path.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in 'path' argument".to_string());
}
}
}
// write / edit require a non-trivial `reason`
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some(format!(
"{} requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= {} chars) explaining why",
tool_name, MIN_REASON_LEN,
));
}
}
// write / edit content must not contain stubs, denial, or assumption language
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit") {
let content = match tool_name {
"write" => args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
"edit" => {
let old = args.get("old").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let new = args.get("new").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
// For edits, scanning old+new together catches stubs in both
return if contains_any(old, STUB_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string())
} else if contains_any(new, STUB_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string())
} else if contains_any(new, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping".to_string())
} else if contains_any(new, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing".to_string())
} else {
return None;
};
}
_ => "",
};
if contains_any(content, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string());
}
if contains_any(content, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
return Some("content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping".to_string());
}
if contains_any(content, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
return Some("content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing".to_string());
}
}
// Bash: exfiltration, sensitive paths, destructive commands
if tool_name == "bash" {
let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if cmd.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in bash command".to_string());
}
// Only check exfiltration for non-standard commands
let is_standard = cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test");
if !is_standard {
for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("potential data-exfiltration command blocked (matched '{}')", pat));
}
}
}
for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("refused to read/write sensitive path '{}'", pat));
}
}
let dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "rm -rf --no-preserve-root", "rm -rf ~",
"rm -fr /", "mkfs.", "dd if=", ":(){", "> /dev/sda",
"chmod -R 000 /", "shutdown ", "poweroff ", "reboot ", "halt "];
for pat in &dangerous {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("destructive command pattern blocked: {}", pat));
}
}
if contains_any(cmd, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some("bash command contains stub pattern".to_string());
}
}
// git_operator: require reason
if tool_name == "git_operator" {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some("git_operator requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= 8 chars)".to_string());
}
}
None
}
/// Check if `text` matches any pattern (case-insensitive substring).
fn contains_any(text: &str, patterns: &[&str]) -> bool {
let lower = text.to_lowercase();
patterns.iter().any(|p| lower.contains(&p.to_lowercase()))
}
/// Build an ASCII tree of the workspace directory structure for the
/// system prompt, so the LLM can see the file layout.
///
/// Flow: for each root, walk using `ignore::WalkBuilder` (respecting
/// `.gitignore` and hidden files) → prefix `[DIR]` for directories →
/// truncate after 1000 entries.
fn generate_workspace_tree(roots: &[std::path::PathBuf]) -> String {
let mut out = String::new();
out.push_str("Current Workspace Directory Structure:\n");
for root in roots {
out.push_str(&format!("Root: {}\n", root.display()));
let walker = ignore::WalkBuilder::new(root)
.hidden(true)
.git_ignore(true)
.build();
let mut count = 0;
for entry in walker.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if let Ok(rel) = path.strip_prefix(root) {
if rel.as_os_str().is_empty() { continue; }
let is_dir = entry.file_type().map(|ft| ft.is_dir()).unwrap_or(false);
let prefix = if is_dir { "[DIR] " } else { " " };
out.push_str(&format!(" {}{}\n", prefix, rel.display()));
count += 1;
if count > 1000 {
out.push_str(" ... (truncated)\n");
break;
}
}
}
}
out
}
/// Synchronous subagent entry point: run up to `ctx.max_steps` iterations
/// of the LLM tool loop.
///
/// Flow: inject system prompt → for each step: resolve provider config,
/// build an LLM client, call `chat_with_tools_non_streaming`, process tool
/// calls or collect text output → send `SubagentEvent`s on `tx` → break on
/// first text-only (non-empty) response.
/// Flow: inject system prompt (with workspace tree if available) → for each
/// step: resolve provider config, build an LLM client, call
/// `chat_with_tools_non_streaming`, process tool calls (gated against both
/// the allowlist and Harness-style content safety checks) or collect text
/// output → send `SubagentEvent`s on `tx` → break on first text-only
/// (non-empty) response.
///
/// Why: runs synchronously on a dedicated thread so the main async event
/// loop is not blocked. Tool gating prevents restricted or risky tools from
/// executing unless explicitly allowed.
/// loop is not blocked. Tool gating prevents restricted, risky, or
/// malicious/poor-quality tool calls from executing.
///
/// Return: the concatenated text output, or an `anyhow::Error` if the LLM
/// call fails at any step.
pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
let mut output = String::new();
let mut messages: Vec<ChatMessage> = Vec::new();
messages.push(ChatMessage::system(ctx.system_prompt.clone()));
// Build system prompt with workspace tree context if we have workspaces,
// giving subagents the same project-awareness as the main agent.
let system_with_context = if ctx.workspaces.is_empty() {
ctx.system_prompt.clone()
} else {
let tree_info = generate_workspace_tree(&ctx.workspaces);
format!("{}\n\n{}", ctx.system_prompt, tree_info)
};
messages.push(ChatMessage::system(system_with_context));
let tool_ctx = crate::tool::ToolCtx::builder()
.session_dir(ctx.session_dir.clone())
@@ -145,6 +362,7 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> an
_args: args.clone(),
});
// Level 1: allowlist check — is this tool even permitted?
if !generally_allowed {
let msg = format!("tool '{}' not allowed for this subagent", tool_name);
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
@@ -155,6 +373,7 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> an
continue;
}
// Level 2: risky tool check — risky tools require explicit permission
if tool_is_risky(tool_name) && !explicitly_allowed {
let msg = format!("risky tool '{}' requires explicit permission; not allowed for this subagent", tool_name);
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
@@ -165,6 +384,20 @@ pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> an
continue;
}
// Level 3: Harness-style content safety gating — mirrors the main
// agent's gate_tool_call checks (path traversal, reason validation,
// stub/denial/assumption scanning, bash exfiltration, destructive
// commands, sensitive path reads).
if let Some(block_reason) = gate_subagent_tool_call(tool_name, &args) {
let msg = format!("Blocked by subagent gate: {}", block_reason);
messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
_tool: tool_name.clone(),
_output: msg,
});
continue;
}
let result = match tools.iter().find(|t| t.name() == tool_name.as_str()) {
Some(tool) => tool.run(&tool_ctx, &args),
None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tool '{}' not found", tool_name)),
+11
View File
@@ -35,4 +35,15 @@ impl AgentDefinition {
self
}
/// Builder method: set the system prompt for this agent.
pub fn with_system_prompt(mut self, prompt: String) -> Self {
self.system_prompt = Some(prompt);
self
}
/// Builder method: set the allowed tool list for this agent.
pub fn with_allowed_tools(mut self, tools: Vec<String>) -> Self {
self.allowed_tools = Some(tools);
self
}
}
+55 -7
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::Duration;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::script::{ScriptPrimitive, WorkflowScript};
@@ -84,6 +85,10 @@ pub type LiveStateFn = Arc<dyn Fn(String, AgentStatus) + Send + Sync>;
/// `execute_primitive` scope, so pipeline stages can pass data between each
/// other while different workflow invocations remain isolated.
///
/// When `timeout_ms` is `Some`, the subagent is killed (abandoned on a
/// separate thread) if it does not complete within the deadline, preventing
/// a stuck stage from blocking the entire pipeline forever.
///
/// Return: the agent's text output, or an error on failure.
fn spawn_single_agent(
agent_id: &str,
@@ -94,6 +99,7 @@ fn spawn_single_agent(
live: Option<&LiveStateFn>,
session_dir: &std::path::Path,
workspaces: &[std::path::PathBuf],
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
use crate::app::subagent::context::build_subagent_context;
use crate::app::subagent::engine::run_subagent;
@@ -170,7 +176,28 @@ fn spawn_single_agent(
}
});
let result = run_subagent(ctx, tx);
// Enforce timeout by running subagent on a separate thread and
// waiting with a deadline. If the deadline expires, the thread is
// abandoned (Rust threads cannot be forcibly killed, but we proceed
// without waiting for it — the drain thread will drop when tx is
// dropped on thread exit).
let result = if let Some(timeout) = timeout_ms {
let (done_tx, done_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<anyhow::Result<String>>();
let timeout_ctx = ctx;
let timeout_tx = tx;
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = done_tx.send(run_subagent(timeout_ctx, timeout_tx));
});
match done_rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(timeout)) {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(_) => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"subagent '{}' timed out after {}ms",
agent_name, timeout,
)),
}
} else {
run_subagent(ctx, tx)
};
let completed_at = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis();
@@ -213,6 +240,9 @@ type ParallelResult = (usize, anyhow::Result<Vec<String>>);
/// `Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>` rather than a global static, so concurrent
/// workflow runs are isolated from each other.
///
/// `timeout_ms` propagates to individual agents so that no single agent
/// can block the entire workflow beyond the configured deadline.
///
/// Return: a `Vec<String>` of all agent outputs (or error strings) in
/// the order they were submitted.
pub fn execute_primitive(
@@ -224,6 +254,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
session_dir: &std::path::Path,
workspaces: &[std::path::PathBuf],
findings: &Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<String>> {
match primitive {
ScriptPrimitive::Agent(prompt) => {
@@ -231,7 +262,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
let findings_snapshot = findings.lock().map(|f| f.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
let agent_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let agent_name = resolved.chars().take(40).collect::<String>();
match spawn_single_agent(&agent_id, &agent_name, &resolved, findings_snapshot, findings, live, session_dir, workspaces) {
match spawn_single_agent(&agent_id, &agent_name, &resolved, findings_snapshot, findings, live, session_dir, workspaces, timeout_ms) {
Ok(text) => Ok(vec![text]),
Err(e) => {
if continue_on_error {
@@ -266,6 +297,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
let session_dir = session_dir.to_path_buf();
let workspaces = workspaces.to_vec();
let findings = Arc::clone(findings);
let to = timeout_ms;
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _permit = sem.acquire();
@@ -275,6 +307,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
&session_dir,
&workspaces,
&findings,
to,
);
if let Ok(mut locked) = results.lock() {
locked.push((idx, result));
@@ -308,7 +341,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
// `findings` Arc (same isolation scope as parent).
let mut all = Vec::new();
for (idx, script) in scripts.iter().enumerate() {
match execute_primitive(script, args, concurrency_cap, continue_on_error, live, session_dir, workspaces, findings) {
match execute_primitive(script, args, concurrency_cap, continue_on_error, live, session_dir, workspaces, findings, timeout_ms) {
Ok(outputs) => all.extend(outputs),
Err(e) => {
if continue_on_error {
@@ -323,7 +356,7 @@ pub fn execute_primitive(
}
ScriptPrimitive::Phase { name: _name, script } => {
execute_primitive(script, args, concurrency_cap, continue_on_error, live, session_dir, workspaces, findings)
execute_primitive(script, args, concurrency_cap, continue_on_error, live, session_dir, workspaces, findings, timeout_ms)
}
}
}
@@ -372,6 +405,7 @@ pub fn run_workflow_tracked(
&script.script, args, concurrency_cap,
script.options.continue_on_error, live_ref,
session_dir, workspaces, &findings,
script.options.timeout_ms,
)?;
let summary = if results.is_empty() {
@@ -409,6 +443,11 @@ fn resolve_template(template: &str, args: &HashMap<String, String>) -> String {
/// A counting semaphore built from a `Mutex` + `Condvar`.
///
/// Used by `execute_primitive` to cap concurrent parallel branches.
///
/// Panic-safety: if a thread panics while holding a permit, the Mutex
/// becomes poisoned. Both `acquire` and the `Drop` implementation recover
/// from poisoned mutexes by discarding the poison, ensuring the semaphore
/// remains usable after a thread panic.
struct Semaphore {
count: Mutex<usize>,
condvar: std::sync::Condvar,
@@ -423,9 +462,15 @@ impl Semaphore {
}
fn acquire(&self) -> SemaphoreGuard<'_> {
let mut count = self.count.lock().unwrap();
let mut count = self.count.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!("[semaphore] mutex poisoned in acquire, recovering");
e.into_inner()
});
while *count == 0 {
count = self.condvar.wait(count).unwrap();
count = self.condvar.wait(count).unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!("[semaphore] mutex poisoned in wait, recovering");
e.into_inner()
});
}
*count -= 1;
SemaphoreGuard { sem: self }
@@ -438,7 +483,10 @@ struct SemaphoreGuard<'a> {
impl<'a> Drop for SemaphoreGuard<'a> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut count = self.sem.count.lock().unwrap();
let mut count = self.sem.count.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
tracing::warn!("[semaphore] mutex poisoned in drop, recovering");
e.into_inner()
});
*count += 1;
self.sem.condvar.notify_one();
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -199,7 +199,10 @@ impl LlmClient {
};
let url = format!("{}/chat/completions", self.base_url);
let max_retries = 10;
// Fewer retries on streaming because `run_agent_turn` has a
// non-streaming fallback that also retries. Combined total is
// capped implicitly by the per-turn timeout and step limits.
let max_retries = 3;
let mut attempt = 0;
let mut started = false;
+2
View File
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ impl Tool for SpawnAgents {
&_ctx.session_dir,
&_ctx.workspaces,
&findings,
None, // no per-agent timeout for spawn_agents
)?;
format_results(results, "parallel")
}
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ impl Tool for SpawnPipeline {
&_ctx.session_dir,
&_ctx.workspaces,
&findings,
None, // no per-agent timeout for spawn_pipeline
)?;
format_results(results, "pipeline")
}