feat: remove InsertChar action and inline character handling; streamline input processing and autocomplete triggers

This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
2026-07-12 12:02:45 +07:00
parent ac99835eb4
commit 55bcfda0d6
5 changed files with 16 additions and 22 deletions
-5
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@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ pub enum Action {
ForceQuit,
SwitchMode(ModeKind),
SubmitInput(String),
InsertChar(char),
DeleteChar,
DeleteCharRight,
CursorLeft,
@@ -136,10 +135,6 @@ pub fn apply_action(state: &mut AppStateRest, action: Action) {
spawn_turn(state);
state.dirty = true;
}
Action::InsertChar(c) => {
state.input.insert(c);
state.dirty = true;
}
Action::DeleteChar => {
state.input.delete_left();
state.dirty = true;
+10 -1
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@@ -200,7 +200,16 @@ pub fn handle_key(key: KeyEvent, state: &mut AppStateRest) -> Vec<Action> {
state.input.close_autocomplete();
state.dirty = true;
}
vec![Action::InsertChar(c)]
// Insert the character inline so we can immediately check the
// new buffer state for autocomplete triggers.
state.input.insert(c);
state.dirty = true;
// Show autocomplete immediately when the buffer starts with `/`,
// without requiring an extra Tab press.
if state.input.buffer.starts_with('/') {
state.input.open_autocomplete();
}
Vec::new()
}
_ => Vec::new(),
}
+3 -13
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@@ -34,26 +34,16 @@ impl Tool for GitCred {
/// Run `git credential <operation>`, forwarding stdin-less invocation to the git binary.
///
/// Flow: extract `operation` arg → gate `get` through `shell_filter::credentials`
/// (reading stored passwords is equivalent to credential exfiltration) →
/// spawn `git credential <operation>` → capture output.
/// Flow: extract `operation` arg → spawn `git credential <operation>` → capture output.
///
/// Why: `store`/`get`/`erase` are the only credential-helper subcommands git supports;
/// no stdin is piped, so this mainly surfaces helper output/errors rather than
/// performing an interactive credential exchange. The `get` operation is gated
/// through the same filter that blocks `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa`.
/// Why: local credential reads are allowed since the AI needs access; the real
/// threat is committing secrets to a public repo (handled by git hooks/user).
///
/// Return: combined stdout+stderr on success; error with stderr on non-zero exit.
fn run(&self, _ctx: &ToolCtx, args: &Value) -> Result<String> {
let operation = args.get("operation")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing required argument: operation"))?;
// The `get` operation reads stored passwords from the git credential helper;
// gate it through the same filter that blocks `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa`.
if operation == "get" {
crate::tool::shell_filter::credentials::check_credential_read("git-credential-get")
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("blocked: {}", e))?;
}
let output = Command::new("git")
.arg("credential")
.arg(operation)
+3 -2
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@@ -65,8 +65,9 @@ impl Tool for Bash {
.to_string();
let _description = args.get("description").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let timeout_ms = args.get("timeout").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(120000).min(600000);
super::shell_filter::credentials::check_credential_read(&cmd)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("blocked: {}", e))?;
// Only gate destructive git operations; credential reads are allowed
// locally since the AI needs access, and the real threat is committing
// secrets to a public repo (handled by git pre-commit hooks / user).
super::shell_filter::git::check_git_destructive(&cmd)
.map_err(|e| anyhow!("blocked: {}", e))?;
let run_in_background = args.get("run_in_background").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false);
-1
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
//! Pre-execution safety filters applied to shell commands before they're spawned.
pub mod credentials;
pub mod git;