459 lines
20 KiB
Rust
459 lines
20 KiB
Rust
//! Subagent execution loop: drive an LLM conversation, gate tool calls
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//! against the context's allowlist, run tools, and stream progress events
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//! to the parent via an mpsc channel.
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//!
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//! Security: subagent tool gating mirrors the main agent's `Harness` checks
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//! (path traversal, reason validation, stub/denial/assumption scanning,
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//! bash exfiltration and destructive-pattern detection) so that subagents
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//! are not a weaker link than the main agent.
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use tokio::sync::mpsc;
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use crate::dto::chat::message::ChatMessage;
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use crate::dto::provider::request::ToolDef;
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use crate::tool::{all_tools, tool_defs, tool_is_risky};
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use super::context::SubagentContext;
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use super::event::SubagentEvent;
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/// Maps a subagent's allowed tool names to concrete Tool trait objects and
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/// OpenAI-style tool definitions.
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///
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/// Flow: load `all_tools()` → if `allowed_tools` is empty, use all; else
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/// filter by membership → derive `ToolDef`s for the LLM.
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///
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/// Why: an empty allowlist means "no restriction" (matches
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/// `build_subagent_context`'s default for non-reviewer roles).
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///
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/// Return: `(tool impls, schema defs)` for the subagent to use.
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fn build_subagent_tools(allowed_tools: &[String]) -> (Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>>, Vec<ToolDef>) {
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let all = all_tools();
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let filtered: Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>> = if allowed_tools.is_empty() {
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all
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} else {
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all.into_iter()
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.filter(|t| allowed_tools.contains(&t.name().to_string()))
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.collect()
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};
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let defs = tool_defs(&filtered);
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(filtered, defs)
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}
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/// Resolve the API key, model, and base URL from persisted app config.
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///
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/// Flow: try the settings key for the active provider → fall back to the
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/// provider's `api_key_env` env-var → fall back to the provider's
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/// `default_api_key` → fall back to an empty string.
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///
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/// Why: matches the main agent's credential resolution exactly, so
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/// subagents automatically inherit the same provider settings.
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///
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/// Return: `(api_key, model, optional_base_url)`.
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fn resolve_provider_config() -> (String, String, Option<String>) {
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let settings = crate::model::settings::Settings::load();
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let app_config = crate::model::app_config::AppConfig::load();
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let mut api_key = settings.api_keys.get(&settings.provider).cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| {
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tracing::warn!("[subagent] no API key for provider '{}' in settings, trying env/default", settings.provider);
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String::new()
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});
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let model = settings.model.clone();
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let base_url = app_config.providers.get(&settings.provider)
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.map(|p| p.api_base.clone());
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if api_key.is_empty() {
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if let Some(provider_cfg) = app_config.providers.get(&settings.provider) {
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api_key = provider_cfg.api_key_env.as_ref()
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.and_then(|env| std::env::var(env).ok())
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.or_else(|| provider_cfg.default_api_key.clone())
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.unwrap_or_else(|| {
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tracing::warn!("[subagent] all API key resolution paths exhausted for '{}'", settings.provider);
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String::new()
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});
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}
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}
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(api_key, model, base_url)
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}
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// ─── Subagent-level tool gating (mirrors Harness checks) ───
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const STUB_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
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"todo!()", "todo!(",
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"unimplemented!()", "unimplemented!(",
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"FIXME", "fixme:", "XXX:", "PLACEHOLDER",
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"REPLACE_ME", "stub_value", "stub_function",
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"fake_response", "fake_data",
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"not implemented", "not yet implemented",
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"to be implemented", "to be done",
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];
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const DENIAL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
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"// skip", "// skipping", "// skipping for now",
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"// for now just", "// punt", "// hack:",
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"// workaround:", "// cba", "// later",
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"// do later", "// ignore for now", "// disable",
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"// bypass", "// quick fix", "// temp fix",
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"// temporary fix", "// temp:", "// temporary:",
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"// noop",
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];
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const ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
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"// assume", "// probably", "// guess",
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"// should work", "// hopefully", "// i think",
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"// should be fine", "// likely",
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];
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const EXFIL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
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"curl ", "wget ", "nc -e ", "ncat ", "/dev/tcp/",
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"base64 -d |", "base64 --decode |",
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"openssl s_client", "ssh -R ",
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"scp /", "rsync /",
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];
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const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
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".ssh/id_rsa", ".ssh/id_ed25519",
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".aws/credentials", ".aws/config",
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".kube/config", ".docker/config.json",
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"/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "/proc/self/environ",
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];
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const MIN_REASON_LEN: usize = 8;
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/// Gate a tool call in the subagent context. Returns `Some(block_reason)` if
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/// the call should be blocked, `None` to allow.
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///
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/// Flow: always blocks dangerous patterns — path traversal, stub/denial/
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/// assumption language, bash exfiltration, destructive commands, sensitive
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/// path reads — regardless of the allowed-tools list. Tools that are not
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/// risky only get the basic allowlist check.
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fn gate_subagent_tool_call(
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tool_name: &str,
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args: &serde_json::Value,
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) -> Option<String> {
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// File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
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if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
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if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
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if path.contains("..") {
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return Some("path traversal detected in 'path' argument".to_string());
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}
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}
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}
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// write / edit require a non-trivial `reason`
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if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
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let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
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if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
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return Some(format!(
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"{} requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= {} chars) explaining why",
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tool_name, MIN_REASON_LEN,
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));
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}
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}
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// write / edit content must not contain stubs, denial, or assumption language
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if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit") {
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let content = match tool_name {
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"write" => args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
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"edit" => {
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let old = args.get("old").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
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let new = args.get("new").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
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// For edits, scanning old+new together catches stubs in both
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return if contains_any(old, STUB_PATTERNS) {
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Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string())
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} else if contains_any(new, STUB_PATTERNS) {
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Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string())
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} else if contains_any(new, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
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Some("content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping".to_string())
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} else if contains_any(new, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
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Some("content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing".to_string())
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} else {
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return None;
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};
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}
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_ => "",
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};
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if contains_any(content, STUB_PATTERNS) {
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return Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string());
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}
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if contains_any(content, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
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return Some("content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping".to_string());
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}
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if contains_any(content, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
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return Some("content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing".to_string());
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}
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}
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// Bash: exfiltration, sensitive paths, destructive commands
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if tool_name == "bash" {
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let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
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if cmd.contains("..") {
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return Some("path traversal detected in bash command".to_string());
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}
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// Only check exfiltration for non-standard commands
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let is_standard = cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
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|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test");
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if !is_standard {
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for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
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if cmd.contains(pat) {
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return Some(format!("potential data-exfiltration command blocked (matched '{}')", pat));
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}
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}
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}
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for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
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if cmd.contains(pat) {
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return Some(format!("refused to read/write sensitive path '{}'", pat));
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}
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}
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let dangerous = ["rm -rf /", "rm -rf --no-preserve-root", "rm -rf ~",
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"rm -fr /", "mkfs.", "dd if=", ":(){", "> /dev/sda",
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"chmod -R 000 /", "shutdown ", "poweroff ", "reboot ", "halt "];
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for pat in &dangerous {
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if cmd.contains(pat) {
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return Some(format!("destructive command pattern blocked: {}", pat));
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}
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}
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if contains_any(cmd, STUB_PATTERNS) {
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return Some("bash command contains stub pattern".to_string());
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}
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}
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// git_operator: require reason
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if tool_name == "git_operator" {
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let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
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if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
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return Some("git_operator requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= 8 chars)".to_string());
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}
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}
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None
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}
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/// Check if `text` matches any pattern (case-insensitive substring).
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fn contains_any(text: &str, patterns: &[&str]) -> bool {
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let lower = text.to_lowercase();
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patterns.iter().any(|p| lower.contains(&p.to_lowercase()))
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}
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/// Build an ASCII tree of the workspace directory structure for the
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/// system prompt, so the LLM can see the file layout.
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///
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/// Flow: for each root, walk using `ignore::WalkBuilder` (respecting
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/// `.gitignore` and hidden files) → prefix `[DIR]` for directories →
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/// truncate after 1000 entries.
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fn generate_workspace_tree(roots: &[std::path::PathBuf]) -> String {
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let mut out = String::new();
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out.push_str("Current Workspace Directory Structure:\n");
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for root in roots {
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out.push_str(&format!("Root: {}\n", root.display()));
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let walker = ignore::WalkBuilder::new(root)
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.hidden(true)
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.git_ignore(true)
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.build();
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let mut count = 0;
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for entry in walker.flatten() {
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let path = entry.path();
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if let Ok(rel) = path.strip_prefix(root) {
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if rel.as_os_str().is_empty() { continue; }
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let is_dir = entry.file_type().map(|ft| ft.is_dir()).unwrap_or(false);
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let prefix = if is_dir { "[DIR] " } else { " " };
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out.push_str(&format!(" {}{}\n", prefix, rel.display()));
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count += 1;
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if count > 1000 {
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out.push_str(" ... (truncated)\n");
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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out
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}
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/// Synchronous subagent entry point: run up to `ctx.max_steps` iterations
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/// of the LLM tool loop.
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///
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/// Flow: inject system prompt (with workspace tree if available) → for each
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/// step: resolve provider config, build an LLM client, call
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/// `chat_with_tools_non_streaming`, process tool calls (gated against both
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/// the allowlist and Harness-style content safety checks) or collect text
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/// output → send `SubagentEvent`s on `tx` → break on first text-only
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/// (non-empty) response.
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///
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/// Why: runs synchronously on a dedicated thread so the main async event
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/// loop is not blocked. Tool gating prevents restricted, risky, or
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/// malicious/poor-quality tool calls from executing.
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///
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/// Return: the concatenated text output, or an `anyhow::Error` if the LLM
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/// call fails at any step.
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pub fn run_subagent(ctx: SubagentContext, tx: mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
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let mut output = String::new();
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let mut messages: Vec<ChatMessage> = Vec::new();
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// Build system prompt with workspace tree context if we have workspaces,
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// giving subagents the same project-awareness as the main agent.
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let system_with_context = if ctx.workspaces.is_empty() {
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ctx.system_prompt.clone()
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} else {
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let tree_info = generate_workspace_tree(&ctx.workspaces);
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format!("{}\n\n{}", ctx.system_prompt, tree_info)
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};
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messages.push(ChatMessage::system(system_with_context));
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let tool_ctx = crate::tool::ToolCtx::builder()
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.session_dir(ctx.session_dir.clone())
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.workspaces(ctx.workspaces.clone())
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.origin(crate::app::state::types::Origin::SubAgent)
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.workflow_findings(ctx.workflow_findings.clone())
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.build();
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// Build tool list once before the loop
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let (tools, tdefs) = build_subagent_tools(&ctx.allowed_tools);
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let tdefs_opt: Option<Vec<ToolDef>> = if tdefs.is_empty() { None } else { Some(tdefs) };
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// Cache provider config once before the loop instead of re-resolving
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// from disk on every step (Settings::load + AppConfig::load each parse
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// JSON files, and the config cannot change between steps).
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let (api_key, model, base_url) = resolve_provider_config();
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let client = crate::service::provider::LlmClient::new(api_key, model, base_url);
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for step in 0..ctx.max_steps {
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// Check abort flag before each LLM call so a stuck subagent can
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// be cancelled from the parent (mirrors main agent behaviour).
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if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
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_step: step,
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_error: "subagent aborted by parent".to_string(),
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});
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anyhow::bail!("subagent aborted by parent at step {}", step);
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}
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// Use the structured tool-calling API so the LLM can request tools with
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// proper arguments, exactly like the main agent does.
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let (response, _usage) = match client.chat_with_tools_non_streaming(&messages, tdefs_opt.clone()) {
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Ok(result) => result,
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Err(e) => {
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
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_step: step,
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_error: e.to_string(),
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});
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anyhow::bail!("subagent call failed at step {}: {}", step, e);
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}
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};
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let has_tool_calls = response.tool_calls.is_some()
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&& response.tool_calls.as_ref().is_some_and(|tc| !tc.is_empty());
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let content = response.content.clone().unwrap_or_default();
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if has_tool_calls {
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let tool_calls = response.tool_calls.clone().unwrap_or_default();
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// Push the assistant message with tool_calls into the conversation
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messages.push(response);
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for tool_call in &tool_calls {
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// Check abort flag before each tool execution
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if ctx.abort_flag.as_ref().is_some_and(|f| f.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst)) {
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepFailed {
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_step: step,
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_error: "subagent aborted by parent during tool execution".to_string(),
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});
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anyhow::bail!("subagent aborted by parent during tool call at step {}", step);
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}
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let tool_name = &tool_call.function.name;
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let args = crate::dto::chat::tool::sanitize_tool_arguments(&tool_call.function.arguments);
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let explicitly_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.contains(tool_name);
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let generally_allowed = ctx.allowed_tools.is_empty() || explicitly_allowed;
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolCall {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_args: args.clone(),
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});
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// Level 1: allowlist check — is this tool even permitted?
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if !generally_allowed {
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let msg = format!("tool '{}' not allowed for this subagent", tool_name);
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messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_output: msg,
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});
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continue;
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}
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// Level 2: risky tool check — risky tools require explicit permission
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if tool_is_risky(tool_name) && !explicitly_allowed {
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let msg = format!("risky tool '{}' requires explicit permission; not allowed for this subagent", tool_name);
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messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_output: msg,
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});
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continue;
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}
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// Level 3: Harness-style content safety gating — mirrors the main
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// agent's gate_tool_call checks (path traversal, reason validation,
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// stub/denial/assumption scanning, bash exfiltration, destructive
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// commands, sensitive path reads).
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if let Some(block_reason) = gate_subagent_tool_call(tool_name, &args) {
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let msg = format!("Blocked by subagent gate: {}", block_reason);
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messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_output: msg,
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});
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continue;
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}
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let result = match tools.iter().find(|t| t.name() == tool_name.as_str()) {
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Some(tool) => tool.run(&tool_ctx, &args),
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None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!("tool '{}' not found", tool_name)),
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};
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match result {
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Ok(output_text) => {
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messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), output_text.clone()));
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_output: output_text,
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});
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}
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Err(e) => {
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let msg = format!("tool '{}' failed: {}", tool_name, e);
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messages.push(ChatMessage::tool_result(tool_call.id.clone(), msg.clone()));
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let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::ToolResult {
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_tool: tool_name.clone(),
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_output: msg,
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});
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}
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}
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}
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|
} else {
|
|
// Text-only response — accumulate and finish
|
|
if !content.is_empty() {
|
|
output.push_str(&content);
|
|
output.push('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::StepCompleted {
|
|
_step: step,
|
|
_output: content.clone(),
|
|
});
|
|
// Break only when we got real content; empty means something went wrong
|
|
if !content.is_empty() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::Completed { _output: output.clone() });
|
|
Ok(output)
|
|
}
|