x-9r-real-ip and the Host fallback were trusted from client-controlled
headers whenever custom-server.js was not in the request path (npm run
start, start:bun), letting a remote caller pose as local to skip API key
auth and reach LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS (/api/mcp/*, /api/tunnel/enable,
/api/auth/reset-password).
custom-server.js now generates a per-process secret at boot and stamps it
as x-9r-peer-token on every request it sanitizes. hasTrustedPeerHeaders()
(src/lib/auth/trustedPeer.js) gates trust in x-9r-real-ip on that secret;
otherwise the guard falls back to Host only in development, and fails
closed in production. Same gate on loginLimiter.getClientIp() so a spoofed
header cannot rotate the login lockout bucket.
Also: fix isLoopbackHostname for IPv6 (::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) which the
old split(":")[0] reduced to empty string; route npm run start /
start:bun through custom-server.js (postbuild copies it into
.next/standalone, build-cli.js fails without it) so documented deployments
keep passwordless local access.
Fourth Alibaba key type — Coding Plan (alicode/alicode-intl) and Model Studio
(alims-intl) both reject Token Plan keys. Registry entry only; PROVIDER_MODELS
builds from providers/registry so no executor or translator work is needed.
Singapore-only (eu-central-1 answers IllegalEndpoint) and OpenAI-compatible
transport only (the Anthropic surface is not authorized for this plan).
Closes#2754Closes#2806
Registry entry plus one config-driven FORMAT_HANDLERS handler. The model id
travels in an HTTP `model` header rather than the JSON body, and the voice is
a reference_id (preset or cloned voice model).
Closes#2411
Nguyen Thanh Dat